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ANNUAL SURVEY OF TENNESSEE LAW
Administrative Law-1962 Tennessee Survey
Val Sanford*
I. PROCEDURE-SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
II. SUBSTANTIVE MATTERs-MoToR CARRIER ACT
The writing of this article is an experience in frustration and de-
spair, for in Tennessee there is little recognition of the existence of
any such body of principle, of legal concepts and techniques, of
procedures and practice, as "administrative law." There is one law,
substantive and procedural, for beer boards, another for the Public
Service Commission, another for the rate-making decisions of the
insurance commissioner, another for employment insurance benefits,
another for licensing well-diggers, and so on ad infinitum-a separate
law, both substantive and procedural, not only for each agency, but
often for each function within an agency.
All of these diverse agencies which now regulate practically every
business and. touch the life of every individual in this state are per-
forming the same basic functions. They are granting and revoking
licenses, establishing and enforcing standards of doing business, fixing
rates and charges, and so on. There should be, and are, from the
standpoint of sound policy at least, certain standards of fairness, of
regularity in procedure, and of efficiency in enforcement which form
a basis for performing the functions of all these agencies. Respect for
the law and for the basic rights of citizens, and concern for the
efficient administration of justice and the accomplishment of the
substantive purposes of the legislature, demand the development and
acceptance of a law of administrative procedure. One encouraging
indication that this will come to pass is the creation of a Law Revision
Commission, charged, among other things, with the duty of proposing
specific reforms in the organization of administrative agencies and the
rules of practice, and procedure before them.'
Only five cases were reported during the period of this survey
which directly involved what may some day be recognized as admin-
*Member, Gullett, Steele & Sanford, Nashville.
1. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1963, ch. 74.
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istrative law. They follow no particular pattern and will be discussed
separately.
I. PROCEDURE-SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Perhaps the most significant of the cases was Fentress County Beer
Board v. Cravens,2 which further confuses an already confused sub-
ject, the judicial review of actions of administrative agencies under
the so-called common law and statutory writs of certiorari.3 In
Hoover Motor Co. v. Railroad & Public Utilities Commission,4 the
court held that a de novo review of non-judicial administrative action,
such as the granting of a certificate of convenience and necessity to
a motor carrier, would be contrary to the constitution as a delegation
of administrative or legislative powers to the judiciary. Justice Tom-
linson, dissenting in that case, argued that "weighing evidence and
determining questions of fact by the preponderance thereof has
always heretofore been regarded as a judicial function."5 The majority
of the court, however, following In re Cumberland Power Co.,6 and a
long line of other cases, looked to the nature of the subject matter
rather than the form of the proceeding and held that the granting of
a certificate of convenience and necessity was clearly an administra-
tive function no different from rate-making, and that the courts could
not constitutionally be empowered to decide such matters de novo.
In the Fentress County case, however, the court, without discussing
the Hoover case and without any review of the other decisions of
which it is representative, held that a statute requiring a de novo
review by statutory writ of certiorari of the actions of county beer
boards in granting licenses was constitutional.
It could be argued that in so holding the court was adopting the
argument of Justice Tomlinson which was rejected in the Hoover
case-and there is some language in the opinion which would appear
to support that position. The two cases can be distinguished, however,
in that the statute in the Hoover case left a considerable measure of
discretion in the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission, while the
statute in the Fentress County case reduced the discretion of the
county beer boards to a minimum. Since the court, however, did not
either overrule, distinguish, or discuss the Hoover case, it is not possi-
ble to draw any persuasive conclusion as to the effect of the Fentress
County case on the future course of judicial review in Tennessee.
2. 209 Tenn. 679, 356 S.W.2d 260 (1962).
3. The cases are reviewed and the basic questions discussed in Lacey, Judicial
Review of Administrative Action in Tennessee-Scope of Review, 23 TENN. L. REv.
349 (1954).
4. 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
5. Id. at 612, 261 S.W.2d at 241.
6. 147 Tenn. 504, 249 S.W. 818 (1922).
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Long v. National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters7 poses an in-
teresting contrast to the Fentress County Beer Board case. The Long
case involved a review of an order of the Tennessee Commissioner of
Insurance and Banking disapproving a rate increase for a number of
automobile insurance companies. In contrast to the beer board
statute, which provided for a de novo review under the so-called
statutory writ of certiorari, the statute her merely provided for
review "upon a writ of certiorari" without specifying the nature of the
writ or the review. The court held that if the commissioner reached
his decision from a consideration of the factors enumerated in the
applicable statute and other relevant factors, his decision was final.
Under such a limited scope of review, it would be practically impossi-
ble to reverse an order of the commissioner, since mere consideration
and not even substantial evidence is all that is required to sustain it.9
Special Products Co. v. Jennings'° involved still another statutory
provision for judicial review. The Tennessee Employment Security
Act provides for the review of decisions of the board of review set up
thereunder by "writ of certiorari," but goes on to specify that the
findings of the board as to facts shall be conclusive "if there be any
evidence to support the same."" The employer here was contesting
claims on charges of misconduct. The court held that for it to find
misconduct would require an adjudication on the merits of a labor
dispute, and that it was without jurisdiction to pass on that question.
II. SUBSTANTIVE MATrERS-MOTOR CARaiER Acr
In Hammer v. Franklin Interurban Co.,'2 the court in construing
the right of common carriers of passengers to render charter service
off their certificated routes held that such carriers were not exempt
from the jurisdiction of the public service commission in rendering
such service even though the trip was rendered at the solicitation of
the party served.' 3 The case further points up the need for review
and clarification of the Tennessee Motor Carrier Act.
7. 209 Tenn. 435, 354 S.W.2d 255 (1961).
8. TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-616 (1956).
9. The court here also held that the appeal in this case was properly made directly
to the supreme court rather than to the court of appeals. In so holding, it did not
distinguish or discuss the leading case of Woodruff v. Nashville, 183 Tenn. 483, 192
S.W.2d 1013 (1946), which, while perhaps distinguishable in that different agencies
and issues were involved, held that appeals in certiorari proceedings under what is
now § 27-912 of the Code should go to the court of appeals.
10. 209 Tenn. 316, 353 S.W.2d 561 (1961).
11. TENN. CODE ANZrx. § 50-1325 1 (1956).
12. 209 Tenn. 399, 354 S.W.2d 241 (Tenn. 1962).
13. The language of the Tennessee statute and the result reached in this case
should be contrasted with the federal Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 551, 552 (1935),
49 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 308(c) (1958).
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Gasoline Transport, Inc. v. Crozier'4 involved the constitutionality
of an amendment to the Motor Carrier Act exempting motor vehicles
used in transportation of petroleum products where the owner or
lessee of the vehicle is engaged in the business of distributing such
products. The court held that the greater financial interest of the
persons within the scope of the exemption in the products being
transported made a reasonable basis for the classification. The court
did not discuss the reasonableness of limiting this classification to the
distributors of petroleum products.
14. 355 S.W.2d 98 (Tenn. 1962).
